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ABSTRACT
A primary concern in the operation of Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is the issue of
balancing energy consumption and lifetime maximization. This dissertation addresses
the problem of unbalanced energy consumption in WSNs by designing traffic load
balancing geographical routing protocols. In order to provide energy balance; two
decentralized, scalable and stable routing protocols are proposed: Game Theoretic
Energy Balanced (GTEB) routing protocol for WSNs and three dimensional (3D)
Game Theoretic Energy Balance (3D-GTEB) routing protocol for WSNs. GTEB
were designed to fit with WSNs deployed in 2D space, while 3D-GTEB designed to
work with WSNs deployed in 3D terrain.
Both protocols are built based on balancing energy consumption into region level
and node level using different game theory in each level. In the first level, evolutionary
game theory was used to balance the energy consumption in various packet forwarding
sub-regions, while in the second level classical game theory was used to balance the
energy consumption in forwarding sub-region nodes. 3D-GTEB benefits from utilizing
the third coordinate of nodes’ locations to achieve better and accurate routing decision
with low network overhead.
The protocols where evaluated analytically and experimentally under realistic sim-
ulation environment. Thus, the results show not only combining evolutionary and
vi
classical game theories are applicable to WSNs, but also they achieve significantly
better performance in terms of energy usage, load spreading, and packet delivery
ratio under different network scenarios when compared to the state-of-art protocols.
Moreover, further investigation is made to evaluate the effectiveness of using game
theories by comparing GTEB with three random test protocols. The results demon-
strated that the GTEB and 3D-GTEB are prolonged the network lifetime from 33%
to 85%, and provided better delivery ratio form 26% to 52% as compared with other
three random test protocols and three similar state-of-art routing algorithms.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) will be very prevalent technology in the near future
due to their unique characteristics and to their great number of applications. WSNs
consist of a large number of autonomous micro-sensors that are deployed in remote
and inaccessible areas to monitor physical or environmental conditions. Although the
sizes of sensors are very small, they have their own on-board processor, as well as com-
munication, mobilizing, position finding, and storage capabilities. Sensor nodes have
the ability to collect and route data, through one or multi hops, to other nodes, or ex-
ternal base stations. Coordination and cooperation among sensor nodes will provide
essential network information collected from monitored physical phenomena. Base
Station (BS) basically acts as a gateway between sensor network and end user by re-
ceiving the data from sensor nodes and forwarding it to the server hence, it is required
to have more computational, energy, and communication resources than sensor nodes.
Routing data in WSNs very challenging task due to infrastructure-less communi-
cations and frequent topology changes. The main drawbacks of the WSNs are the
limitation of storage capacity, bandwidth, communication range and power resources.
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This chapter presents examples of WSNs applications, challenges in WSNs, problem
statement, and contributions of this work.
1.1.1 Applications of wireless sensor networks (WSNs)
WSN applications can be classified into three categories based on sensing and report-
ing mechanisms [1, 2].
1. Periodic reporting applications: in these applications, the sensor nodes will
sample the collected data periodically, store and transmit collected data to the
base station. This type of scenario is commonly used in monitoring applications
such as automatic irrigation systems [3], habitat surveillance [4], and military
operations [5]. The main advantage of this category is that data generation rate
and traffic volume is predictable.
2. Event driven applications [6–8]: In these applications each sensor has the abil-
ity to sense and evaluate the usefulness of information. If the detected information
is useful the information will be transmitted to the base station for evaluation. The
main property of this type of application is the randomness of event occurrence,
which correlates with the time and place. Therefore, time and packet traffic load
is unpredicted. The surveillance applications, disaster relief applications, intrusion
detection applications, and patients monitoring applications are a few examples of
such event driven applications.
3. Query based applications [9]: In these applications, the sensory data are regu-
larly sampled and stored in senor nodes. The base station sends request messages
to the specific senors to fetch the data directly. The main challenge in this category
is that the data management process due to the limitation of the storage capacity
of the sensors.
The following subsection will present a brief discussion of WSNs challenges.
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1.1.2 Challenges in Wireless Sensor Network (WSNs)
The limitation in WSNs resources make it necessary to design new routing protocols
that differ from regular routing protocols designed for other wireless communication
systems. Some of the limitations in WSNs are as following:
1. Energy restriction: Wireless sensors are powered with a limited power supply
such as batteries and capacitors. These limited energy resources have a direct
impact on the network lifetime [10]. The network lifetime is the duration from
the deployment time until the time when the first sensor runs out of energy. In
unattended and remote environments, replacing or charging batteries is not cost
effective and practical. Hence, good utilization of the limited power resources is
important to prolong the network lifetime.
Geographical Routing Protocols (GRPs) due to their low network overhead can
increase energy utilization and improve network lifetime. In this dissertation, I
focused on energy balance challenge to prolong the network lifetime by evenly
distributing traffic load in the network using GRP.
2. Mobility: Due to the sensor node’s mobility, the topology of the network may
change frequently, which may cause route failure, high collision rate, blockage rout-
ing information, and increase energy consumption [11]. Thus, network mobility
must be addressed in a data propagation protocol design.
3. Network deployment: Network deployment is another challenge in WSNs, spe-
cially when a WSN deployed in remote or inaccessible areas. It is very difficult
or even impossible to determine their location in advance. For example, sensors
that are serving to monitor battlefields or disaster areas are usually randomly
thrown from airplanes over areas of interest and these sensors must be able to
determine their own locations, initiate their sensing, and communicate with their
neighbors [12]. Therefore, any routing protocol design must be able to adapt with
3
random network deployment scenarios and various network densities.
4. Scalability [13]: Due to the increasing number of sensors in a network, the mes-
sages that must be routed to the base station increase. Therefore, data propagation
protocol must be able to scale with changes in a network; such as changes in net-
work density, network connectivity, and/or sensing operations. Decentralized and
localized algorithms, where sensor nodes usually employ, are often used to satisfy
the scalability requirements.
5. Fault tolerance [14]: WSNs are inherently prone to failure due to the low cost
hardware and limitation of the energy supplies. A failure of a sensor node should
not influence the overall functionality of the network. So in such cases, a network
must have the ability to accommodate a new route to the base station. This may
need actively rerouting packets through a more reliable part of the network that
has more resources (available energy).
6. Location dependent contention [15]: The traffic load on a wireless channel
varies with the number of sensor nodes that are present in a given region. The
contention over the usage of a channel will increase with the increase in the number
of sensor nodes. The high contention over the channel causes a large number of
collisions and consequently inefficient utilization of energy and bandwidth. There-
fore, any reliable data propagation protocol must have the property of preventing
or minimizing high channel contention.
7. Security [9, 16, 17]: Normally, the traffic routing in the sensor network is con-
nectionless, consequently making it highly susceptible to security threats. The
shared wireless medium makes the network subject to various attacks such as de-
nial service attacks. Therefore, WSNs require security solutions that fit with their
wireless communication and limited resources.
8. Quality of service [16, 18]: The quality of service challenge varies depend-
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ing on WSNs applications. For example, disaster field monitoring entails reliable
minimum delay delivery of sensory information for ensuring fast response by a
corresponding authority. In contrast, agricultural monitoring and animal-borne
applications require balancing energy consumption in sensor nodes and long net-
work lifetime to minimize maintenance effort and cost.
The main goal of this dissertation is to extend the network lifetime by distributing
traffic load in WSNs. This gaol is achieved by employing a decentralized, scalable and
energy-balanced geographical routing protocol called GTEB and three dimensional
routing protocol called 3D-GTEB. Both routing protocols utilize a combination of
evolutionary and classical game theories.
1.2 Problem Statement
This dissertation provides solution to problems associated with GRPs to achieve
global balanced energy consumption in order to extend the lifetime of network. These
problems are discussed hereunder:
Problem 1. Unbalanced energy consumption: uneven energy dissipation in the Ge-
ographical Routing Protocols (GRPs) can result in premature network failures,
which shorten the lifetime of the network, accelerate network partitioning, and
generate energy hole problem [19–23]. Therefore, utilizing routing protocol for
fair traffic load distribution among wide range of sensors is one of the key meth-
ods to prolong operations of the network.
Problem 2. Unbalanced traffic load and redundant transmission: GRPs forward the
packets toward the destination based on one of the following techniques:
A. Shortest path forwarding (SPF) approach [24–26]: Where, a packet travels
from source to destination through the shortest straight path. That leads to
an overuse of the nodes along this path. These overused nodes deplete their
5
energy faster than other nodes, which creates network partitions and failures.
Hence, the traffic load must be spread on large number of sensor nodes to
evenly deplete energy consumption and improve the network lifetime.
B. Region Based Forwarding (RBF) approach [27–29]: A packet is broadcasted
to a set of nodes located in the same region and all sensors transmit the re-
ceived packet toward the destination. That causes redundant transmissions.
These redundant transmissions can increase energy consumption. Therefore,
a new innovative routing protocol is required to improve energy utilization
to prolong the network lifetime.
Problem 3. 3D network deployment [30–32]: sensor networks are deployed in a 3D
space. Utilizing 2D geographical routing protocols for 3D wireless networks
may not provide an accurate solution and in some cases it is not possible such
as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) communication. Thus, there is a strong
desire to use 3D GRP to improve accuracy and energy efficiency of the net-
work. Therefore, by including third coordinate of nodes’ position is decreased
the number of dropped packets, while energy efficiency and the lifetime of the
network is increased. For this reason, it is important to consider the third coor-
dinate of nodes’ location in order to avoid route description errors, transmission
redundancies, and high packet miss ratio.
Problem 4. Energy hole problem [22, 33]: Energy hole problem is associated with
GRPs due to over utilization of some nodes over other nodes. For instance, in
case of SPF the nodes that are located along the straight line between source
and destination will deplete their energy sooner than outer sub-regions nodes.
Moreover, nodes near the sink will suffer from high traffic load and deplete
their energy because these nodes send their own data as well as forwarding
other nodes’ data to the base station. This rapid energy depletion of some
nodes generate energy holes problem, which can significantly reduce the life
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span of the network.
In this work, GRPs will be used because they have lower network overhead than
topological routing protocols because they do not require route discovery and route
maintenance. Additionally, decentralized routing algorithms can be implemented
in GRP efficiently where, each node makes its forwarding decision based on its local
information only. These positive attributes of GRPs make them promising candidates
for WSNs. In this dissertation, GRPs are designed to enhance the network lifetime
by using game theory [26,34].
In this dissertation, two novel decentralized, scalable and energy balanced routing
protocols are proposed:
A. Game theoretic energy balanced (GTEB) routing protocols for WSNs. GTEB is
designed and implemented in WSN deployed in 2D space.
B. Three dimensional game theoretic energy balanced (3D-GTEB) for WSNs. 3D-
GTEB is designed and implemented in WSN deployed in 3D space.
The protocol operations are verified via a combination of evolutionary game theory
(EGT) and classical game theory (CGT), an extensive simulation as well as analytical
evaluations which have been conducted to verify their validity.
1.3 Contributions
The primary contributions of this dissertation are:
1. A novel energy balanced geographical routing protocol is proposed and exten-
sively evaluated theoretically and in simulation, which is called: Game Theoretic
Energy Balanced Routing Protocol (GTEB). GTEB protocol was designed based
on a combination of evolutionary game theory (EGT) and classical game theory
(CGT). GTEB was compared to two competing GRPs and to a probabilistic for-
warding protocol. GTEB shows a promising performance compared to other two
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competing protocols in terms of prolonging network lifetime, packet delivery rate,
and energy consumption per packet. Moreover, GTEB is compared to three other
advised geographical routing protocols which are designed to evaluate the reliabil-
ity of GTEB in terms of region forwarding selection and forwarding node selection
techniques.
2. Energy balance is achieved in the region level by balancing the traffic load over a
set of packet forwarding regions around every sender and/or relay node between
the source and destinations. In order to minimize the energy consumption per
region and to delay the network partitioning at the region level, evolutionary game
theory (EGT) was applied to balance the traffic load among these forwarding
regions. Energy balance was achieved, in the node level, by distributing the traffic
load evenly among the nodes in the forwarding region in order to delay network
partitioning at the node level. The classical game theory (CGT) was used to
balance the traffic load among a number of nodes in the forwarding region to
minimizing the energy consumption per node. By combining region level energy
balanced (RLEB) with node level energy balance (NLEB) the ultimate objective
of this work, maximizing network lifetime, was achieved.
3. GTEB which is designed for 2D WSN was extended to 3D-GTEB to provide a
solution to 3D WSN. The network lifetime, packet delivery ratio, and average
energy consumption per packet were further improved by in-cooperating third
coordinate of node locations.
4. The energy hole problem was solved by reflecting dynamic changes in the network
by detecting the dynamic changes in the network conditions using evolutionary
game theory.
The results were promising and the protocols exhibited exactly the desired prop-
erties: localized forwarding decision, flexible when an energy hole problem occurs,
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optimal routing solution for minimizing energy consumption in sensor nodes, highly
reliable (delivery rate), highly scalable, fits with any network size, and significantly
extended network lifetime.
In RLEB, the analysis of the region level evolutionary game modeling has reached
stable traffic load distribution over a set of forwarding regions using the concept of
replicator dynamics. Such analysis was applied to 2D and 3D-forwarding regions.
This work shows that if the traffic load distribution was disturbed, the traffic distri-
bution would return to its original stable distribution. The analytical study in the
NLEB proves that the effectiveness of using classical game theory in NLEB problem
modeling and shows that all nodes play their role as a forwarder/or not at equilibrium
satisfactory point. In summary, the routing protocol frameworks designed in this dis-
sertation not only support the WSNs quality of services requirements, but also able
to minimize energy consumption in sensor nodes, provide high reliability (delivery
rate), and avoid energy hole problem.
1.4 Research Objectives
All problems that discussed in 1.2 are investigated and solved throughout this dis-
sertation. In this work, network conditions and sensor node behavior were studied
and it is found that designing a decentralized decision making routing algorithm can
extend the network lifetime. The use of the EGT to balance the energy dissipation
over the set of forwarding regions was proven, and also this study shows that the
CGT can be used to balance the energy consumption in senor nodes that are located
in the same forwarding region. Therefore, to achieve such wide energy balance both
EGT and CGT were combined in one protocol. The objectives of the research have
achieved throughout five steps as following:
Step 1. In this phase, a routing algorithm for 2D WSN was developed to balance
traffic load over a set of forwarding regions around the senders/relays. This
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protocol was designed to make all forwarding regions consume their energy at
the same time. The routing protocol is investigated in OMNeT++, and it was
implemented using an evolutionary game.
Step 2. In this phase, the routing protocol in step 1 was enhanced by balancing the
traffic load among nodes that were located in the same forwarding regions. This
enhancement was investigated in OMNeT++, and it was implemented using a
classical game.
Step 3. Both phases were combined together to form one game theoretical energy
balance routing protocol; named GTEB. GTEB was evaluated based on an
analytical analysis and compared to three state-of-art geographical routing pro-
tocols: RTLD [29], RPAR [35], and probabilistic forwarding protocols. This
routing protocol was designed to fit with WSNs deployed in 2D space and is
applicable to any network topology with various traffic loads.
The proposed protocol also evaluated with the three advised random forwarding
protocols.
Step 4. In this step, a new 3D-GTEB routing protocol was designed by enhanc-
ing GTEB by including the third coordinates of node locations in the routing
calculation. This protocol was investigated in OMNeT++, and evaluated by
comparing the network lifetime and the packet delivery ratio in 3D-GTEB to
GTEB.
Step 5. The stability in GTEB and 3D-GTEB was mathematically analyzed and
the results proved that the protocols reach a stable state and all sensor nodes
deplete their energy approximately at the same time.
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1.5 Dissertation Organization
A background and literature review is given in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 identifies the
solution for data propagation protocol and presents the results of Game Theoretic
Energy Balanced (GTEB) Routing Protocol for Wireless Sensor Networks. Chap-
ter 4 describes the design of Game Theoretic Energy Balancing Routing in Three
Dimensional (3D-GETB) for Wireless Sensor Networks. The evaluation details of the
proposed protocols are presented in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, the conclusions of the
proposed research in this dissertation is summarized and some recommendations for
future work are presented.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
The process of establishing paths from a given sensor node to any base station through
a single or multiple hop is called routing. Routing establishment is the main re-
sponsibility of the network layer of the communication protocol stack. Finding and
maintaining routes in WSNs are not trivial tasks because energy restrictions and unre-
liability of the wireless medium cause unpredictable topological changes. Since WSNs
applications require a large number of sensor nodes to be deployed in large geograph-
ical areas, thus the multi-hop communication approach is necessary. In multi-hop
routing approach, nodes must not only generate and transmit the data which they
sense, but also act as relays and forward the data of other nodes. However, when
the nodes are deployed in harsh and inaccessible areas, usually they are deployed in
a randomized way and the resulting topologies are non-uniform and unpredictable.
In such case, it is important for the sensor nodes to have the ability to cooperate
in order to determine their positions, learn about their neighbors, and explore the
route to the base station. Thus, designing routing protocol that can adapt to topo-
logical changes and is able to fit to WSNs limited resources is essential to extend
the network lifetime. Moreover, reliable routing protocols have various influences on
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packet delivery ratio (PDR), quality of service (QoS), fault resistance, and energy
dissipation fairness [26, 36, 37]. Therefore, WSNs require routing solutions that are
light weighted, adaptive, scalable, and flexible.
2.2 Wireless Sensor Network Routing Metrics
The routing protocol metrics are used to express various objectives of the routing
protocols with respect to the limited resources of WSNs. This section provides a
brief overview of the routing protocol metrics that are related to this study:
A. Network lifetime: The network lifetime is defined as the duration before any
sensor node in the network becomes inoperative due to energy depletion [24, 38].
Thus, it is important to balance energy dissipation in wide range of sensor nodes
to prevent premature network failure. In such balance, it has to ensure the average
energy usage per node is the same in all sensors to prolong the network lifetime.
B. Average energy consumption per packet: The average energy consumption
per packet refers to the average amount of energy spent by all nodes to successfully
deliver a packet to the destination [10,39]. The goal of this metric is to minimize
the total amount of energy dissipation for broadcasting a packet from the source
node to the base station (sink). Average energy consumption per packet metric
is the basic concept to evaluate the energy efficiency in routing protocols.
C. Packet delivery ratio: The packet delivery ratio refers to the ratio of delivered
packets to the base station out of the total number of generated packets by the
sender node [40, 41]. The main objective of using this metric is to assess the
network performance and protocol reliability.
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2.3 Routing Protocol Classification
In literatures, a wide range of routing protocols has been proposed to solve multi-hop
routing problem [36]. In general, the routing protocol algorithms can be classified into
two categories: topological routing protocols and geographical routing protocols.
A. Topological Routing Protocols:
Topological routing protocols (TRPs) were designed on the basis of routing al-
gorithms that engineered for mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) [37, 42]. In the
topological routing approach, a route is usually pre-defined among nodes and
stored in a routing table before initiating a packet transmission, where every node
has its own routing table [43]. The main advantage of this approach is that a route
is readily available whenever a node requires sending a message to any other node.
On the other hand, it is not adaptable to the dynamic changes in the network
and has high network overhead due to the route discovery and route maintenance
procedures, which were very costly in the energy constrained WSNs networks.
In [37] a survey on multi-path routing and their challenges is presented.
B. Geographical Routing Protocols in WSNs:
Geographical routing protocols (GRPs) benefit from location knowledge of the
sensor nodes to send data from any given node to the destination. This is done
without the need to build up a routing table [26, 36]. Hence, the sender does
not need to check the route availability or breakage as the packets travel from the
sender to the destination they may take different routes depending on the network
status. Furthermore, eliminating the reliance on topological information makes
GRPs suitable to handle dynamic conditions that often present in WSNs. This
makes geographical routings a valuable option to devise decentralized and scal-
able routing protocols which can balance energy utilization in WSNs. However,
GRPs require location information. This information can be provided via Global
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Positioning System (GPS) in outdoor deployments, and signal strength and time
of arrival based location estimation techniques in indoor deployments [27]. More-
over, GRPs can be applied in WSNs deployed in two dimensional (2D) terrain or
deployed in three dimensional (3D) terrain [44].
2.4 Energy Balanced in WSN
The main goal of energy balance in WSNs is to prolong network lifetime. Energy
balance is commonly achieved through routing protocols by evenly distributing traffic
load among nodes to ensure that the average energy expenditure in all nodes is the
same [24, 45]. In GRP, there are two common energy balance routing techniques:
route level energy balance [46,47] and region level energy balance [23,28,48].
2.4.1 Route level energy balance
Route level energy balance is aiming to prolong the network lifetime by optimizing
the energy usage in the senor nodes that belong to a set of pre-defined routes. In this
approach, a higher traffic load is observed around the line between the source and
destination node [49, 50]. Additionally, more traffic will be passing through one hop
nodes away from the destination causing quick energy depletion and early network
partitioning. That is why, considering balancing energy in route level is not enough
to achieve network wide energy balance.
2.4.2 Region level energy balance
In this approach, the energy balance can be achieved using region based forwarding
techniques [22,50]. The terrain of network is divided into a set of geographical regions
and all the nodes that are located in those regions will forward the received packets
causing redundant transmissions [27,28,40]. For that reason, the imbalance will still
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exist in the region nodes in this approach. This imbalance can lead to premature
network partitioning as some nodes in a forwarding region are used for packet for-
warding more often.
Accordingly, both route level energy balance and region level energy were combined
in this dissertation to achieve an effective and wide energy balance routing protocols.
2.5 Game Theory An Overview
Game theory is the study of the conflict and cooperation among a set of players.
The players can be any kind of decision makers such as individuals, groups, firms, or
combination of these. The concepts of game theory provide a method to formulate,
analyze, and understand strategic interactions. In general, game theory can be classi-
fied into two classes of theories [51]. These classes are: classical game theory (CGT),
and evolutionary game theory (EGT).
2.5.1 Classical game theory
Classical game theory (CGT) is a part of applied mathematics that describes and
studies interactive decision making processes, this is where several players make their
decisions based on the potential effect of the interest of other players [52, 53]. Game
theory was firstly introduced by Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in their work
“Theory of Games and Economic Behavior”, published in 1944 [54]. The classical
game theory comprises two types of games: cooperative and non-cooperative games.
In the cooperative game the player selects his/her strategies based on the coordination
along with other the players in the game, while in non-cooperative games each player
selects his/her strategies without any interference from other players. In this study,
I considered non-cooperative game of N players with mixed strategies.
Normally, any a classical game comprises of three basic components:
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1. Players: The decision makers in the modeled scenario are players and denoted
by a finite set, N = {1, ..., N}, where N ≥ 2. A player is said to be rational
when he/she can choose an action in a way to magnify his/her own payoff.
2. Strategies: A strategy is one of the given possible actions of a player and each
player has a finite set of K strategies denoted by Si = {s1, s2, ..., sK}, where Si
represents the strategy space for player i.
The strategy is defined as pure strategy when the player plays one of his/her
strategies without any probability and has no uncertainty about the payoff that
result from playing any strategy. In contrast, when the player chooses one of
his/her strategies with certain probability without knowing exact payoff that
result from playing any strategy it is called mixed strategy. In this dissertation,
I considered N -player non-cooperative game with mixed strategies.
3. Payoff function: The function that quantifies a player’s preferences for a
given strategy is called payoff function and is denoted by Un(si, s−i), where si
represents the strategy that is selected by player i and s−i represents strategies
that are selected by other opponents. The received payoff by any player depends
on the strategy he/she picked and the strategies which all the other players
picked.
In a game, every player tries to maximize his/her payoff by choosing his/her own
best response strategy to what other opponents choose. Such strategy is denoted by
s∗i ∈ Si and opponent strategies are denoted by s−i ∈ S−i. The best response strategy
is mathematically defined as follows,
(∀si ∈ Si) ui(s∗i , s−i) ≥ ui(si, s−i). (2.1)
When all players choose their best response strategies, the resulting strategy combi-
nation is called Nash equilibrium strategies [55]. Nash equilibrium is considered the
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solution that satisfies all the players in the game. When the game reaches Nash equi-
librium state no player can increase his/her payoff by deviating from current strategy
unilaterally. Nash equilibrium condition is expressed as:
∀i ∈ N (∀si ∈ Si) ui(s∗i , s∗−i) ≥ ui(si, s∗−i) (2.2)
It is worth mentioning that the condition in (2.2) is held in every N -player non-
cooperative game whenever mixed strategies are allowed [52].
2.5.2 Evolutionary game theory
Evolutionary game theory (EGT) was originally developed by J. Maynard Smith
and G.R Price [56] to study the evolutionary and animals conflict in nature. In
particular, EGT is used to make reliable predications about population dynamics,
where individuals in the populations are repeatedly engaged in strategic interactions.
Evolutionary games are also useful to find the stable balance in the distribution of
the proportions of population competing for resources in absence of a global view
of the resources and the total size of population [56]. The proportion distribution
of population λ over a set of different geographical regions is called the population
state and denoted by, X = [X1, .., XK ], where Xk =
λk
λ
and λk is the number of
individuals that uses region k. A balance is achieved when an individual in a portion
of population X receives the same fitness (payoff) in all geographical regions K. This
balance evolves over time based on the resource consumption rate and the availability
of residual resources at various regions. An evolutionary game consists of five main
components:
1. Player: Any individual in the population is considered a player.
2. Population: The set of players that engage in strategic interactions are con-
sidered as population of players.
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3. Strategies: The variations of selections from a set of K geographical regions
by a player are considered as the set of strategies.
4. Fitness function: The function that quantifies the expected payoff that is
received by the player when he/she plays one of his elementary strategies against
the mean strategy of the population in the conflicting field is called fitness
function.
5. Replicator dynamics: The set of differential equations that captures the in-
flow and outflow of players from one region to other regions represents Replicator
dynamics.
In this study, the fitness function is defined as a decreasing function of population,
which depends on the players’ density that follows various strategies. On that account,
the fitness function is expressed as follows,
Fk(X) = Bk −Hk(Xkλ), (2.3)
where, Fk(X) represents the fitness function of the player when it uses region k and B
represents the available resources for the player in region Rk, and Hk is an increasing
function of players’ density in the conflict field.
The evolution of proportions of a population that adopt different strategies (re-
gions) over time can be modeled through the replicator dynamics [57], which can be
given as follows,
X˙k = Xk[Fk(X)− F¯ (X)], (2.4)
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where, X˙ = [X˙1, .., X˙K ] represents the vector of the players’ distribution over all
regions and F¯ (X) represents the mean fitness for the population and given by:
F¯ (X) =
K∑
k=1
XkFk(X). (2.5)
Ideally, such distribution would converge to a stable state, where the proportions do
not change with time and even if they change, they would return to the stable state
after a period of time. Such equilibrium proportion distribution is given by the vec-
tor, X∗ = [X∗1 , ..., X
∗
K ].
At this moment the strategies that are followed by the players are called evolu-
tionary stable strategies (ESSs), whenever the following conditions are hold:
A. The fitness function for a player must be the same in all regions.
B. The player cannot increase its fitness by moving to any other region.
These two conditions are robust and a refined version of the Nash equilibrium. The
mathematical expressions of ESS is given hereunder:
XF (X∗) ≤ X∗F (X∗) (2.6a)
XF (X) ≤ X∗F (X) (2.6b)
Equation (2.6a), represents the Nash equilibrium condition and (2.6b), represents the
evolutionary stability condition.
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2.6 Literature Review
The research work in this dissertation is related to the energy balance in WSNs. The
literatures reviewed throughout this dissertation is divided into the following three
sub-sections.
2.6.1 Review of energy balance in 2D WSNs
Maximizing network lifetime can be achieved using different methods such as altering
transmission power as in [23], designing power aware routing protocol as in [24], and
distributing traffic load among least power routes as in [49,50]. Although each of these
methods offers benefits, the most plausible is the load balancing. However, there is no
globally applicable load balancing solution for extending the network lifetime in GRPs
This dissertation provides a globally applicable solution to extend network lifetime by
balancing traffic load over regions and nodes, with scalable and distributed manner
using GT and GRP.
GRPs are gaining popularity and are being employed for industrial applications
such as advanced metering infrastructures for smart grids [26]. Geographical forward-
ing does not require routing overhead and every node is able to make its forwarding
decision distributively and locally. GRPs have also been proposed to balance en-
ergy in the WSNs to prolong the network lifetime. Ahmed and Fisal [29] proposed
a quadrant based directional forwarding scheme, called Real-time Load Balance Dis-
tribution protocol (RTLD), which limits the forwarding task to a quadrant of the
forwarding nodes. However, redundant transmissions in the selected quadrant may
occur and some quadrants could be utilized more than others, depending on the loca-
tion of the source. Jinnan et al. [23] presented heuristic routing scheme to solve the
problem of uneven energy consumption around energy hole in GRPs. This scheme
cannot be generalized to achieve load balancing in the entire network. Charilaos E.
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et. al [21] presented a solution to the problem of condensing a traffic load around the
base station (sink) by adjusting the transmission power of the nodes to by-pass these
vulnerable nodes around sinks, and transmitting directly to the sink with certain
probability. Although using a larger transmission power is more energy expensive, it
helps extending the lifetime of the network. Petrioli et. al [22] presented ALBA-R
localized and distributed GRP for balancing traffic load on nodes that are located
around energy holes so that those nodes do not run out of energy too early. In our
case, GTEB can detect the energy hole problem areas and does not forward any traffic
toward such areas. Chipara et. al [35], suggested a real-time power aware routing
protocol (RPAR) to find balance between end-to-end delay and energy consumption
using transmission power adjustment. RPAR is compared to the proposed protocol
in this dissertation.
2.6.2 Review of energy balance in 3D WSNs
As a part of this dissertation is related to the energy balance in 3D WSNs, therefore
some of the related papers are discussed in this subsection. In order to overcome pre-
mature energy depletions in 3D WSNs different methods have been proposed [58,59].
For instance, proposals such as [30] and [31] offer to balance traffic load by mapping
2D network on a sphere and by routing packets on the surface of the sphere using
virtual spherical coordinates. Particularly in [30], Circular Sailing Routing (CSR) is
proposed to reduce congestion of the hot spots at the center of the network, which
extended the lifetime of the whole network. Balanced energy consumption in a set of
predefined routes was investigated in [60]. However, that approach requires a large
number of routes to achieve a global load balance in order to provide a feasible solu-
tion [19]. Nonetheless, most of the available literatures offer solutions to 2D networks
or assume the networks are 2D to reduce the complexity [60, 61]. Realizing impor-
tance of 3D, a number of protocols are emerging in the literature for 3D WSNs [32].
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Ellipsoid geographical 3D greedy-face based routing protocol was proposed to extend
the network lifetime [44]. Greedy based routing algorithm, called ALFA+, was pro-
posed to balance traffic load in a 3D network by forwarding packets toward regions
that experience minimum traffic load [62].
2.6.3 Review of game theory in WSNs
A. Review of classical game theory in WSNs:
Game theory was proven to provide versatile solutions for dynamic and distributed
networking problems [63]. CGT is used in GRPs for various problems related to
the end-to-end delay optimization, task allocation, relay selection, and network
congestion [64,65]. Tekinay [66] had presented a survey for game theory applica-
tions in security and energy efficiency with different formulations of these problem
based on the approach of game theory. Behzadan et al. [48] proposed a game the-
oretic heterogeneous balanced data routing (HBDR) algorithm for WSNs with
tree topology. In this protocol, a hierarchical network is constructed using CGT
to provide a load balanced tree that maximizes the lifetime of network.
Kamhoua et al. [67]proposed a GT based congestion avoidance mechanism for a
GRP around the line between the source and destination. Naserian and Tepe [68]
used game theoretic routing to reduce routing overhead by selecting forwarding
nodes to provide connection without network partitioning. Neda et al. [65] applied
forwarding task allocation problem to classical game in order to optimize energy
consumption among sensor nodes to extend network lifetime. Huang et al. [69]
proposed to use CGT in base stations for relay selection and transmission power
allocation for the network.
B. Review of evolutionary game theory in WSNs:
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EGT is emerging as an important tool to solve dynamic networking problems due
to changes in energy state, channel state, and topology [70]. For example, Niy-
ato and Hossain [71] used EGT to allocate bandwidth for the users based on the
service cost of various wireless networks. Anastasopoulos et al. [72] employed an
evolutionary game to optimize traffic routing over multi-path wireless back-haul
networks experiencing rain attenuation. Khan et al. [63] applied EGT to fairly
distribute users to various wireless access network technologies for bandwidth
and cost. Altman et al. [70] designed EGT based routing protocol for WSNs to
control congestion and reliability influenced by the wireless channel’s characteris-
tics. In [73], EGT is implemented to solve the packet forwarding problem when
a network consists of heterogeneous nodes operated in networks with different
authorities. This shows that the forwarding cooperation among authorities can
evolve and provide stable communication. In this dissertation, load balancing
based on available energy levels in the surrounding nodes was performed using
EGT.
2.7 Summary
In this chapter the routing protocol definition, routing protocol metrics, routing al-
gorithms classification, and the related techniques that are used to balance energy
consumption in WSNs are discussed. It showed that geographical routing protocol
provides a better energy solution than topological protocols. Introductions to the
classical and evolutionary game theories were also provided. The literature review
of energy balanced in 2D WSN, 3D WSN, and game theory in WSNs are presented.
The combination of the two levels of game theories decision making will be presented
in the next chapter as the core of the protocol design in this dissertation.
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CHAPTER 3
GAME THEORETIC ENERGY BALANCED (GTEB) ROUTING
PROTOCOL FOR WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS
3.1 Introduction
Extending network lifetime and sensor functionality is crucial for successful utilization
of wireless sensor networks (WSNs) in a number of challenging applications, where
replacing or charging energy storage units (i.e. batteries) in the sensor devices is
impractical or not cost effective. For example, ARGO project deploys thousands of
floating sensors to gather hydro-graphic data from oceans and their energy supply
cannot be replaced or recharged [74] after they are released to the environment. Pro-
longing sensors lifetime can significantly reduce the cost of ARGO project and help us
to understand health of the oceans better. There are many similar large data gather-
ing projects for which expansion of WSNs lifetime is extremely important. Different
approaches have been used to extend the lifetime of sensor nodes. One prominent
approach is to balance the WSN communication in the network in order to deplete
energy at similar time or rate [21,29,49]. In theses approaches, routing decisions play
an important role in selecting candidate paths for balancing energy [20,33,38,50].
Geographical routing protocols (GRPs) ) seem to be more suitable for WSNs be-
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cause they do not need routing tables, and therefore, do not require route discovery
and route maintenance mechanisms which incur large overhead. However, GRPs re-
quire location information. This can be provided using Global Positioning System
(GPS) in outdoor deployments, and signal strength and time of arrival based loca-
tion estimation techniques in indoor deployments. Although these may increase the
complexity of the GRPs for networks where nodes do not move, and data gathering
applications where location of sinks are fixed, the benefits of simplicity of GRPs ex-
ceeds this extra complexity of obtaining location information. For this reason routing
protocol for low power and lossy networks (RPL) as a GRP is adapted for smart grid
applications [75]. One problem with GRPs, is that they do not have a global view of
the network, including energy information at regions and nodes, and providing this
information can incur large overhead and increase complexity. This issue is addressed
by adopting distributed and relatively simple algorithms to balance energy in order
to extend WSN lifetime.
This dissertation uses a game theoretic (GT) approach to build a viable load
balancing solution to extend WSNs lifetime. GT offers interesting decision making
mechanism in distributed and dynamic environment in absence of global view and
certainty. For this reason GRP combined with GT was used in this work to take
advantage of inherent benefits of this combination. In this work, the energy balance
problem is solved at both region level and node level. In RLEB, the objective is to
balance the energy consumption around a sender such that all sub-regions around
the sender will participate fairly and deplete their energy approximately at the same
time. After selecting the participating region, NLEB is required to select the most
favorable forwarder node in this sub-region. Because of the objectives of RLEB and
NLEB are different, RLEB employs evolutionary game theory (EGT), and NLEB
employs classical game theory (CGT). EGT captures the dynamic energy changes in
the sub-regions while CGT captures the selfish behavior of the nodes to preserve their
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energy in the selected sub-region.
The main contribution of this dissertation is twofold. First, a new method is de-
veloped for extending the network lifetime by balancing traffic load at two levels, over
regions and at the nodes in those regions. Second, the energy hole problem in WSN
geographical routing is mitigated using EGT [23]. The energy hole problem occurs
due to an uneven traffic load distribution. For instance nodes closer to the sink have
to take heavier traffic load leading to deplete of their energy faster and partitioning
of the network. In this dissertation, the energy hole problem is mitigated by using an
evolutionary game.
In this chapter a description of the protocol with is presented in Section 3.2. Sub-
section 3.2.1 provides a detailed region level energy balance while Sub-section 3.2.5
presents the detailed of node level energy balance of the proposed protocol. Sec-
tion 3.3 presents the results and discussion. Finally, conclusions are drawn and further
research is suggested in Section 3.4.
3.2 Protocol Description
The proposed game theoretic energy balanced (GTEB) routing protocol is designed
to provide energy balance to randomly deploy multi-hop WSNs withM homogeneous
nodes with transmission range is r. Initial energy of a node is E Joules. The nodes
know their locations and the location of the destination node (base station). In the
network, any node can be a source and can report events periodically or when they
occur. The problem of achieving network wide energy balance is broken down into
the following two sub-problems:
A. RLEB at sub-regions.
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Figure 3.1. Subregion and node selection in the proposed protocol.
B. NLEB within the sub-region.
The energy balance at region level is achieved using EGT and the energy balance at
node level will be achieved using CGT. The transmission range of a sender is divided
into K forwarding sub-regions based on network density ρ. Figure 3.1 illustrates this
scenario. In the figure, the selected sub-region is shaded and the selected forwarding
node is shown.
Based on an EGT, a sender forwards a packet to one of its neighborhood with the
following information:
1. Angle, θ, which is bounding the selected forwarding sub-region.
2. Nk, number of neighbors in this sub-region.
3. Sender’s location (x, y).
4. Proportion of packets, λk assigned to this sub-region.
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Figure 3.2. GTEB’s functional diagram.
This information, provided by the packet, will allow surrounding nodes to identify
whether they are in the forwarding sub-region. Then the nodes in the selected sub-
region will play N -player non-cooperative classical game to identify which one will
be potential forwarding node (PFN). One of the PFNs, in that sub-region who wins
the game becomes a sender node, and its turn, plays it’s own evolutionary game to
select the next forwarding region in order to balance energy consumption in its own
surrounding.
Figure 3.2 shows a schematic functional diagram of the distributed decision making
processes in GTEB protocol. The node neighbor discovery function depicted in the
figure is executed once at the deployment time of the network in order to allow nodes
to learn the number of one hop neighbors. Other functions will be executed whenever
a node receives a new packet from one of its neighbors. The node drops a received
packet, if it is not located in the designated forwarding sub-region or if the packet
has been forwarded before.
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3.2.1 Region level energy balance (RLEB)
The objective of RLEB is to spread the forwarding task around the sender node fairly
such that surrounding nodes deplete their energy at the same time. EGT is employed
to achieve this objective. We assume total number of packets λ sent by a sender is S
or any relay, which represents the total population of region level evolutionary game
(RLEG). This population of packets is distributed to K sub-regions throughout the
operation. Hence a sub-region k will forward λk packets and, consequently the total
number of packets that are forwarded by all sub-regions is λ =
∑K
k=1 λk. The task
of RLEG is to define the proportion of packets that can be forwarded by each sub-
region in every game interval. Senders play the RLEG on behalf of the packet, and
the set of strategies for the packet is the selection of sub-regions, which is denoted by
R = {R1, R2, ..., RK}. Every packet has set of K strategies to play. The proportion
of the packets forwarded through k th sub-region is specified by Xk, which is given by
λk
λ
. Thus, the packet population distribution vector X over all sub-regions is given
by X = [X1, X2, ..., XK ]. The goal of employing EGT is to find the stable packet
proportions distribution of population in all sub-regions in order to make all regions
consume their energy approximately at the same time. Such stable vector is called
equilibrium packet proportions distribution vector or stable state X∗.
This vector can be obtained by modeling the energy balance problem into a set of
differential equations, which will be the replicator dynamics of the RLEG. The most
important part of evolutionary game is to design a fitness function that captures
the energy consumption in the network. The fitness function will be used to identify
switching probability from one region to another region. Both of these will be utilized
to obtain replicator dynamics to find the equilibrium solution for the game. The
fitness function Fk(X) for a packet is expressed in term of gain and cost of utilizing a
region for forwarding. The gain, Ek, represents the available remaining energy in the
sub-region k. The cost of sending a packet through a sub-region depends on following
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parameters:
1. Packet transmission and reception energies.
2. Number of nodes in that sub-region Nk.
3. Number of packets sent through this sub-region λk.
Consequently, the fitness function is given by
Fk(X) = Ek − [λ ∗Xk ∗ (2 ∗Nk ∗ Etr + Etx)], (3.1)
where Etr and Etx are the energy consumed by a node while receiving and transmitting
a packet respectively. Etr and Etx are both dependent on the packet length of m bits,
the transmission radius of d meters, and few hardware parameters. Then, energy
consumption by a node for transmitting a packet can be expresses as
Etx(m, d) = m ∗ (etc + eta ∗ dα), (3.2)
where the energy spent by transmitter electronics is denoted by etc, and transmitter
amplifier by eta. These are hardware dependent parameters related to the processing,
sending the packets, and α is the path loss exponent whose value is larger than 2 in
sensor networking applications.
The energy consumption by a node for receiving a packet is given by
Etr(m) = m ∗ erc, (3.3)
where erc is the transceiver effeteness during the start-up time, which is ignored due
to its dependence on the type of MAC protocol used.
All nodes located in the same sub-region (in transmission range of forwarding/sender
node) will spend the receiving energy cost as they all receive the packets. After sub-
region selection, one node only will be selected based on N -player non-cooperative
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game to forward the packet in NLEB, and the forwarding node will spend the trans-
mission cost. The values of transmission and receiving cost can be obtained from any
sensor node’s data-sheet. For example, the energy consumption for transmission and
reception of an IRIS sensor node is 51 and 24 milliwatts, respectively [76]. During
the protocol run time, packets forwarded in sub-region k will be further forwarding
by next hop neighbor in a given game interval.
The fitness function in (3.1) expresses that a packet will be forwarded to a sub-region
as long as the available energy in that sub-region Ek is more than energy threshold
value given by
Ek/(λ ∗Xk) ≥ (Etx + Etr), (3.4)
which represents the required energy to receive and forward a packet. That is why the
packet’s share of energy will be decreased with the increase in the number of packets
in a forwarding sub-region. Hence, a sub-region is considered dead if its residual
energy drops below the energy threshold value.
3.2.2 Replicator Dynamics
The replicator dynamics provide packet population distribution over different sub-
regions. Selection of a sub-region is considered a strategy for a packet. In every game
interval, a sender decides the proportions of packets to be forwarded through various
forwarding sub-regions based on their residual energies. The switching probability
Pk,l(X), from sub-region l to sub-region k is associated with region fitness values
Fl(X) and Fk(X), respectively. This switching probability can be defined as,
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Pk,l(X) =

βXk[Fk(X)−Fl(X)]if Fk(X)>Fl(X), k 6= l
0 if Fk(X)>Fl(X), k 6= l
1−∑i 6=k,i∈K βXl[Fi(X)−Fk(X)] if k = l,
(3.5)
where Xl is the proportion of packets in the sub-region l and β is the normalization
factor for the total energy in all sub-regions and given by,
β =
1∑K
i=1 Ei
. (3.6)
where Ei is the initial energy in node i. The rate of the change in the number
of packets that forwarded through sub-region k represents the difference between the
inflow and outflow packets. The expected number of inflow packets that might switch
from another region to the region k is expressed as,
∑
l 6=k
XlPk,l(X), (3.7)
and the expected number of outflow packets that might switch from region k to the
other sub-regions is given by,
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∑
l 6=k
XkPl,k(X). (3.8)
The summation of all probabilities of switching from sub-region k to all other sub-
regions including the sub-region itself must be one, which is reflected by the following
equation,
Pk,k(X) +
∑
l 6=k
Pk,l(X) = 1. (3.9)
Accordingly, the differential equations of the replicator dynamics that captures the
net change in the number of packets in game interval (unit time) in sub-region k, and
can be given as follows,
X˙k =
∑
l 6=k
XlPk,l(X)−
∑
l 6=k
XkPl,k(X)
X˙k =
∑
l 6=k
XlPk,l(X)−Xk
∑
l 6=k
Pl,k(X)
X˙k =
∑
l 6=k
XlPk,l(X)−Xk[1− Pk,k(X)]
X˙k =
∑
l 6=k
XlPk,l(X) +XkPk,k(X)−Xk
Hence, the replicator dynamics can be given by,
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X˙k =
K∑
l=1
XlPk,l(X)−Xk (3.10)
Using (3.5) the transition probability matrix P for a scenario with two sub-regions is
provided by,
P (X) =
1 βX1[F1(X)− F2(X)]
0 1− βX1[F1(X)− F2(X)]
 (3.11)
The change in packet proportions over all sub-regions for a sender is obtained substi-
tuting (3.11) in (3.10), can be written in a matrix form as follows,
X˙ = P (X)X −X. (3.12)
When the number of inflow and outflow packets from all sub-regions are equals then
the system is in the stability state.
3.2.3 Evolutionary equilibrium
RLEG reaches the equilibrium state when the rate of change in the proportions of
packets in all sub-regions, X˙ becomes zero vector. At this state, the proportion of
packets is represented by X∗. In order to find the equilibrium state, the solution of
the set of system equations in (3.12) must be obtained as in below,
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 X˙1
X˙2
 =
 1 βX1[F1(X)− F2(X)]
0 1− βX1[F1(X)− F2(X)]
 ·
 X1
X2
−
 X1
X2
 =
 0
0

(3.13)
Where,
X1 > 0,
X2 > 0
and
K∑
k=1
Xk = 1 (3.14)
According to Brouwer fixed point theorem [77], there will be at least one fixed point
(Nash equilibrium) for any continuous function over a closed interval. In this work,
the set of equations in (3.13) depend on the switching probability in (3.5). The
witching probability is a continuous function of X on the closed interval [0,1]. Conse-
quently, (3.13) have fixed points, which are denoted by X∗. From (3.13) and (3.14),
the net changes in proportions of packets in the two sub-regions are given by
X˙1 = X1 + βX2X1[F1(X)− F2(X)]−X1 = 0
X˙2 = X2 − βX2X1[F1(X)− F2(X)]−X2 = 0
(3.15)
Simplifying the above equation in (3.15) leads to:
36
X˙1 = βX1X2.[F1(X)− F2(X)] = 0
X˙2 = −βX1X2.[F1(X)− F2(X)] = 0
(3.16)
By solving (3.13) and (3.14) using (3.1), setting Ck = 2NkETR − ETX , substitute
X2 = 1−X1 in (3.16) and βX1X2 > 0 the equation (3.16) can be solved as follows,
(E1 − λC1X1)− (E2 − λC2(1−X1)) = 0
E1 − λC1X1 − E2 + λC2(1−X1) = 0
E1 − λC1X1 − E2 + λC2 − λC2X1 = 0
E1 − E2 −X1λ(C1 + C2) + λC2 = 0
X1 =
E1 − E2 + λC2
λ(C1 + C2)
(3.17)
Hence, the elements of equilibrium vector are specified by
X∗1 =
E1 − E2 + λC2
λ(C1 + C2)
,
X∗2 = 1−
E1 − E2 + λC2
λ(C1 + C2)
(3.18)
At the equilibrium state, a packet’s fitness will be the same in all sub-regions, that
37
is F1(X) = F2(X) = ... = Fk(X) and no packet can increase its fitness by moving to
another sub-region (strategy).
3.2.4 Stability analysis
In this section of analysis, the stability of the equilibrium state X∗ is examined.
To prove the population distribution stability, Equation (3.12) is linearized at X∗,
whereas F1(X) = F2(X), and Eigenvalues of Jacobian matrix J(X1, X2) are obtained.
Jacobian matrix for two forwarding sub-regions is given by
J(X1, X2) =
 βX1X2 ∂F1(X)∂X1 + β[F1(X)− F2(X)]X2 −βX1X2 ∂F2(X)∂X2 − [F1(X)− F2(X)]X1
−βX1X2 ∂F1(X)∂X1 − β[F1(X)− F2(X)]X2 βX1X2
∂F2(X)
∂X2
+ β[F1(X)− F2(X)]X2

(3.19)
Since F1(X) = F2(X) at the equilibrium points X
∗, Jacobian matrix of the system
will be
J(X1, X2) =
 βX1X2 ∂F1(X)∂X1 −βX1X2 ∂F2(X)∂X2
−βX1X2 ∂F1(X)∂X1 βX1X2
∂F2(X)
∂X2
 (3.20)
Hence,
J(X1, X2) =
−βλC1X1X2 βλC2X1X2
βλC1X1X2 −βλC2X1X2
 (3.21)
Eigenvalues γ of Jacobian matrix can be found by solving the following equation,
det(J(X1, X2)− Iγ) = 0 (3.22)
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where I is the identity matrix. The solution of (3.22) shows that Eigenvalues are
−λC1βX1X2−λC2βX1X2 and zero. Since the real part of Eigenvalue is negative, the
ESSs condition is satisfied based on [78]. This proves that RLEB evolutionary game
reach stable state. The region is considered dead when it does not have enough energy
for transmission. Analysis and proof of the stability of X∗ for K packet forwarding
sub-regions are provides in appendix A.
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Table 3.1. THE PAYOFF MATRIX OF N-PLAYER NON-COOPERATIVE GAME.
aaaaaaaaaaaa
Player A
N − 1 Players 1− (1− q)N−1
T
(1− q)N−1
T¯
q T −δ −∆,−δ −∆ v − δ,0
1− q T¯ 0,v − δ 0,0
3.2.5 Node level energy balance (NLEB)
The objective of NLEB game is to balance the energy consumption in a sub-region
by selecting one forwarding node from N nodes in the sub-region k. This game is
formulated as an N -player non-cooperative game of the following three components:
1. Players: The set of nodes in the same forwarding sub-region are consider as
players and denoted by N = {n1, n2, ..., nN}, where N ≥ 2.
If there is only one node in a sub-region, then this node will forward the packet
without playing any game.
2. Strategies: Each node has two mixed strategies, represented by a set S =
{T, T¯}, where T represents transmission and T¯ represents no-transmission. Be-
ing a mixed strategy game, nodeA plays one of available strategies against N−1
opponent nodes. Other players play their strategies with their corresponding
probabilities as shown in Table 3.1. Let the probability of transmission by a
node is q, and no-transmission is 1− q, then the probability of transmission by
at least another node is 1 − (1 − q)N−1; hence, the probability that all other
nodes may not transmit is (1− q)N−1.
3. Expected payoff: the expected payoff for node i is denoted by Ui(s), quantifies
the award for node i when it plays one of its available strategy against other
N − 1 players.
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The matrix norm formulation that describes the game scenario is given in Table 3.1.
In this game, if two or more nodes are playing transmission strategy simultaneously,
all of the nodes will incur a collision cost of ∆ and a transmission cost of δ, where
∆ is greater than δ. If one node plays transmission strategy and other nodes play
no-transmission strategy, the first node will receive reward value of v and incurs a
transmission cost δ, v will be greater than δ. If no node plays transmission, then the
payoff will be zero for all nodes.
The expected payoff calculated using Table 3.1 for a node ni to forward a packet
is given by
E[Ui] = q[(−∆− δ)(1− (1− q)N−1) + (v − δ)(1− q)N−1] (3.23)
Correspondingly, the expected payoff for no-transmission is zero. Therefore, equating
E[Ui] to zero will give probability q
∗ of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium as:
[(−∆− δ)(1− (1− q)N−1) + (v − δ)(1− q)N−1] = 0
(−∆− δ)− (−∆− δ)(1− q)N−1 + (v − δ)(1− q)N−1 = 0
−(−∆− δ) = −(−∆− δ)(1− q)N−1 + (v − δ)(1− q)N−1
(∆ + δ) = [(∆ + δ) + (v − δ)](1− q)N−1
∆ + δ
∆ + v
= (1− q)N−1
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(1− q) = (∆ + δ
∆ + v
)
1
N−1
q∗ = 1− [(δ + ∆)/(∆ + v)] 1N−1 (3.24)
The number of player nodes in a region is N , the transmission cost δ = 51milliwatts
and collision cost of ∆ = 2×δ are known and can be extracted from IRIS datasheet [76].
Each node uses its Nash equilibrium as a decision criteria to forward or drop the packet
using its own forwarding probability in (3.26).
However, reducing the number of forwarding nodes may lead to network dis-
connectivity. Nash equilibrium in equation (3.24) depends on the number of neighbors
in forwarding sub-region N , and the reward value v. Hence, it is essential to determine
the range of v and N , such that satisfy the following two conditions:
1. The number of players N must be greater than or equal to two [52].
2. The network connectivity is maintained with minimum routing overhead [79].
Previous studies in [80] and [79] showed that the required number of neighbors
to maintain overall connectivity is at least four.
When the value of v is low, then the probability in (3.24) will be low, which
might result in network dis-connectivity. However, for a high reward value that
means the nodes have high their forwarding probability, and when v →∞ all nodes
will forward the received packets causing redundant transmissions. For successfully
forwarding a packet, the number of neighbors for each node should be on average of
four, and the forwarding probability will be 0.9 6 q 6 0.99. By using (3.24) with
δ = 51milliwatts [76], where the a node transmits with 3dBm the value of v can be
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calculated as follows,
(N − 1) log q∗ = log(∆ + δ
∆ + v
)
log(0.01) ≤ 1
N − 1 log(
∆ + δ
∆ + v
) ≤ log(0.1)
−4 ≤ log(∆ + δ
∆ + v
) ≤ −1
−4 ≤ log(∆ + δ)− log(∆ + v) ≤ −1
−4 ≤ log(2δ + δ)− log(2δ + v) ≤ −1
1 ≤ log(2δ + v)− log(3δ) ≤ 4
1 ≤ log(2δ + v
3δ
) ≤ 4
e1 ≤ (2δ + v
3δ
) ≤ e4
2.7 ≤ (2δ + v
3δ
) ≤ 10.8
8.15δ ≤ 2δ + v ≤ 32.16δ
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Table 3.2. NASH EQUILIBRIUM WITH DIFFERENT REWARD VALUE AND
NUMBER OF NEIGHBORS
Number of neighbors q∗ with v = 30.16δ q∗ with v = 20δ q∗ with v = 6.16δ
2 0.910045528 0.875 0.641157085
3 0.70007589 0.646446609 0.400965014
4 0.551935104 0.5 0.289384311
5 0.452346724 0.405396442 0.226026495
6 0.382261667 0.340246045 0.185331592
7 0.330623502 0.292893219 0.157019757
8 0.291116807 0.257002855 0.136196597
9 0.259964004 0.228894587 0.12024236
10 0.234790582 0.206299474 0.107630064
11 0.214036685 0.187747604 0.097410166
12 0.196638232 0.17224672 0.088961435
13 0.181845676 0.159103585 0.081860445
14 0.169116352 0.147819604 0.075808702
15 0.158047986 0.138027179 0.070589755
16 0.148336208 0.129449437 0.066042835
17 0.139746551 0.12187392 0.062046035
18 0.132095526 0.115134914 0.058505246
19 0.125237508 0.109101282 0.055346658
20 0.119055464 0.103667904 0.052511572
21 0.113454279 0.098749537 0.04995272
Hence, the value of v will be in the range of,
6.15δ ≤ v ≤ 30.16δ (3.25)
In order to find the best value of v a set of experiments were conducted as depicted in
Table 3.2. Figure 3.3 shows that Nash equilibrium forwarding probability versus the
number of neighboring nodes in forwarding sub-region, when v is 30.16δ both above
conditions are maintained.
Once the nodes in a selected forwarding region k receive a packet, those nodes
will start N -player non-cooperative game, and each node i calculates its forwarding
probability, pik, per equation (3.26) in order to make a forwarding decision. The
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Figure 3.3. Nash equilibrium q∗ versus changes in reward value v with different
number of neighbors.
received packet will be forwarded only when the value of pi,k is less than the Nash
equilibrium q∗ in equation (3.24). This forwarding probability is calculated based on
the following three factors:
1. The ideal share of packets that must be forwarded by every node in a selected
forwarding region, ( (Ci−C´i)
Ci
) .
2. The ratio of the residual energy in a forwarding node, ( E´i
Ei
) .
3. The share of packets that is assigned to a selected forwarding sub-region by a
sender, ( (λk−λ´k)
λk
).
Hence the forwarding probability is given by
pi,k = 1− [((Ci − C´i)
Ci
)(
E´i
Ei
)(
(λk − λ´k)
λk
)], (3.26)
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Figure 3.4. Forwarding probability versus number of forwarded packets and node’s
residual energy.
where Ci given by λk/Nk is the number of packets that must be ideally forwarded by
the node i in the selected sub-region and C´i is the number of packets that are already
forwarded by node i. The residual energy of the node i, E´i with initial energy Ei,
λ´k is the number of packets out of a total number of packets, λk that have already
been assigned to all nodes in the sub-region k. Any node, which decides to forward
a packet based on the N -player non-cooperative forwarding game, will play its own
evolutionary game to balance the energy in its surrounding sub-regions.
Figure 3.4 shows that the forwarding probability pi,k increases as the number of
forwarded packets by the node increase. A node will not forward a packet when the
forwarding probability is greater than its Nash equilibrium, and will wait for a round
trip time (RTT) or until it overhears the forwarded packet by other nodes. If the node
does not overhear the packet, it will gradually decrease its forwarding probability until
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Table 3.3. SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Parameter Value
MAC IEEE802.15.4
Path loss exponent Log-normal Shadowing
Shadowing deviation (dB) 2.5
Data packet size 128 bytes
Data rate 200 kbps
Initial energy 3.3J
Transmission power 1mW
Traffic type CBR
the packet is forwarded either by the node itself or by any other node. A sensor node
is considered dead when it does not have enough energy for transmission.
3.3 Results and Discussion
The performance of the proposed routing protocol, GTEB, has been evaluated using
OMNET++4.2.2 network simulator with MiXiM framework [81]. The simulation pa-
rameters are given in Table 3.3. WSN was deployed in two-dimensional (2D) terrain
of 100 × 100m2 dimensions, in which 121 homogeneous sensor nodes were randomly
deployed. A converge-cast traffic pattern with four sources was used and one des-
tination node or base station. Although the data rate was large, when the number
of sources and hops were increased, the available bandwidth (200 kbps) could be
easily consumed. The performance of GTEB was analyzed based on three routing
performance metrics. These metrics are :
1. The network lifetime.
2. Average energy consumption per packet.
3. Packet delivery ratio.
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The performance of GTEB was evaluated in comparison with three other compet-
ing GRPs. These protocols are:
1. A real-time routing protocol with load distribution in wireless sensor networks
(RTLD) [29].
2. Real-time power-aware routing in sensor networks (RPAR) [35].
3. Probabilistic forwarding geographical routing protocols: This protocol is de-
signed to verify if the proposed game theoretic approach was better than some
simple probabilistic approach. In the probabilistic approach, an eligible for-
warding node will forward a packet with a probability of 0.5, instead of using
the Nash equilibrium.
This comparison was evaluation based on three scenarios: i) the first scenario con-
cerns the lifetime of network with different network densities, while ii) the second
scenario concerns the energy consumption per packet and finally iii) the third sce-
nario concern the packet delivery ratio.
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Figure 3.5. Network lifetime with different packet generation rates.
3.3.1 Network lifetime
This set of experiments was conducted to evaluated the effectiveness of packet for-
warding probability mechanism, in GTEB, which depends on Nash equilibrium as
a decision criteria. Moreover, the experiments evaluate the effect of two levels of
game theories balancing technique on the lifetime of WSNs. Figure 3.5 represents a
comparison of the lifetime of GTEB and probabilistic forwarding. This figure proves
that using forwarding probability provided by Nash equilibrium condition and fit-
ness function in game theoretic approaches allows better utilization of energy in each
sensor network compared to the probabilistic forwarding protocol. GTEB integrates
the accumulated energy in various sub-regions and the remaining energy in every
individual node in sub-region in forwarding decision, while probabilistic forwarding
protocol does not consider the energy factor in their forwarding decision and only
forward based on a fixed probability. Another reason for the shorter network lifetime
in probabilistic forwarding is that there could be more than one forwarding node in
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Figure 3.6. Average energy consumption per packet with different packet generation
rates.
one hop neighborhood, which increases redundant broadcasts and increases energy
consumption in the network. GTEB prolongs the network lifetime by approximately
33 to 58%, for packet generation rates of 1 to 14 packet per second, respectively when
compared to the probabilistic forwarding protocol.
3.3.2 Energy consumption per packet
This experiments show the effectiveness of balancing energy in a set of forwarding sub-
regions and in nodes in the sub-regions in GTEB and balancing energy consumption in
regions only in RTLD protocol and in a set of pre-defined routes in RPAR protocol.
The average energy consumption per packet for various packet generation rates is
depicted in Figure 3.6. This figure shows that GTEB consumes 20 to 40% less energy
as compared to the other protocols examined in this experiment. This less energy
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Figure 3.7. Packet delivery ratio with different packet generation rates.
consumption in GTEB in comparison to RTLD and RPAR is because GTEBs game
theoretic forwarding decision making mechanism reduces redundant transmission and
spread traffic load over large number of sensor nodes. Also, GTEB has no explicit
exchange of control messages for exchanging neighbor information, which is generally
a requirement in other GRPs.
3.3.3 Packet delivery ratio
The packet delivery ratio was measured with packet generation rate of 1 to 10 packet
per second in this set of experiments. Figure 3.7 presents the results of this experi-
ment. GTEB provides 25 to 30% higher packet delivery ratio than the other GRPs
compared in this simulation study. The reason for the higher delivery ratio in GTEB
is that it reduces redundant transmissions and avoids congested areas using its energy
balanced forwarding mechanism.
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3.4 Summary
In this research, it was observed that game theory is an efficient tool, which can be
used to balance energy consumption. It is also observed that the combination of two
different types of games are crucial to achieve a network wide energy balance. In
particular, evolutionary games are useful to model the phenomenon in which every
node tries to spread a population of data packets to achieve energy balance in its
neighborhood without a defined global energy profile. Additionally, it was shown
that classical games are necessary to avoid redundant transmissions among a finite
number of nodes in a contention domain. The simulation study demonstrates that
a game theoretic approach provides longer network lifetime, lower average energy
per packet, and higher packet delivery ratio then other comparable protocols. Of
particular note, the proposed protocol increases the network lifetime by 33% to 58%
when compared to a probabilistic forwarding based on GRP. In a practical WSN
deployment, GTEB can improve both operation time and cost.
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CHAPTER 4
GAME THEORETIC ENERGY BALANCING ROUTING IN THREE
DIMENSIONAL WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS
4.1 Introduction
Energy balance in WSNs is very important issue for extending the network lifetime,
since nodes are generally powered with limited energy sources. The process of replac-
ing or recharging these energy sources is very difficult, and even can be impossible
after they are distributed. Balancing energy usage is one of the key methods to pro-
long operation of the networks. That is why many energy balancing protocols have
been proposed in the literature. However one of the commonly made assumptions is
that the network is deployed in two dimensional (2D) space. In many real-life appli-
cations however, WSNs are actually deployed in three dimensional (3D) space [32].
For example, sensors used to monitor the giant redwoods in California are deployed at
various heights on the trees [82]. Another example of 3D deployment of WSNs is drone
or unmanned aerial vehicle networks [83]. In such cases, discarding third coordinate
results in errors in finding the most desirable route and causes inefficient energy usage
due to overhead and redundancies [32]. Accordingly, considering the third dimension
in routing decisions is an important factor to improve energy efficiency and energy
balance in WSNs.
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In addition to energy balance, reducing protocol overhead associated with route
discovery and maintenance messaging can further improve network lifetime. For-
tunately, geographical routing protocols (GRPs) eliminate overhead associated with
route discovery or route maintenance [26] at an expense of location information. Pro-
viding location information to nodes and destination location to packets are easier
in a number of scenarios than route discovery and maintenance. That is why GRPs
are emerging as a valuable option for WSN routing problems. However, there still
redundancies in GRPs, which may increase energy consumption such as region based
forwarding techniques used in some GRPs [28,84]. For this reason, designing a simple
efficient GRP is essential to balance energy consumption to prolong the lifetime of
WSNs. Another drawback associated with GRPs is the lack of global information in
the nodes. That is why there is a need for a highly decentralized yet efficient protocols
to optimize network resources. Game theory can be employed in network protocols
to provide decentralized, scalable, and stable solutions. Game theory can capture
the selfish behavior of nodes and dynamic energy changes in different regions of the
network and can allow GRPs to achieve desired energy balance in the network. Addi-
tionally, game theory offers an intelligent decision making mechanism in distributed
and dynamic environment under uncertainty. For these reasons, game theoretic en-
ergy balance routing protocol was proposed to extend the network lifetime [64,85,86].
In this chapter, unbalanced energy consumption problem in 3D WSN is modeled
using two different game levels (sub-problems) which are:
1. Wedge level energy balance (WLEB). An evolutionary game theory (EGT) is ap-
plied to evenly distribute traffic load among a set of forwarding wedges (FWs)
such that surrounding nodes of the sender will deplete their energy approxi-
mately at the same time.
2. Node level energy balance (NLEB). A classical game theory (CGT) is applied
to balance energy consumption in sensor nodes in the selected wedge such that
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all nodes deplete their energy approximately at the same time in that wedge.
The third coordinate of nodes “locations” was included using the above two different
game levels. This coordinate will provide an accurate route description which enable
more reliable energy balance solution to 3D network. The main contributions of this
chapter are:
1. Two levels game theoretic decision making are employed to extend the network
lifetime by balancing traffic load and reducing redundant transmissions in the
network.
2. The approach is designed to work with WSN deployed in 3D space.
3. The energy hole problems, commonly associated with geographical routing, is
solved by reflecting dynamic changes in the network.
4. By including the third coordinate, the redundant transmissions will be reduced
as the forwarding nodes are limited by the the 3D space.
A description of the routing protocol with evolutionary game model for wedge
level energy balance and N -player non-cooperative game model for node level en-
ergy balance will be discussed in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 presents the results and
discussion. Finally, the conclusion is presented in the summary Section 4.4.
4.2 Protocol Description
A network of M homogeneous wireless sensors is considered to be deployed in 3D
terrain of volume Ω, which is a rectangular prism with dimensions w × h × d (m3).
It is assumed that the position information is aquaired using either embedded GPS
receiver or other techniques such as signal strength or location services. By using a
single hop neighborhood exchange, each node can learn the location information of
its neighbors at the deployment time. The nodes have a spherical transmission range
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Figure 4.1. Illustration of 3D-GTEB scenario.
of radius r and initial energy E Joules. In this network, any node can be considerd
as a source, and reports events periodically or after a triggering mechanism, or the
nodes can be act as a relay to forward the reports of othe sensors. The problem of
extending lifetime of WSN is achieved through traffic load balance by breaking down
the problem into the obve two sub-problems WLEB and NLEB.
Similar to the 2D WSNs approach described in Chapter 2, the energy balance in
WLEB is modeled as an evolutionary game and in the NLEB is modeled as N -player
non-cooperative game. In WLEB, evolutionary game was applied to capture the
dynamic energy changes in the forwarding wedges and prevents traffic condensing to
a certain region. In NLEB, N -player non-cooperative game was applied to capture
the selfish behavior of the sensor nodes when they are trying to preserve their energy,
by not forwarding, and motivate them to participate in the forwarding process.
The spherical transmission range r of a sensor node is divided into K forwarding
wedges (FWs) based on the network’s density. Figure 4.1 illustrates the selected for-
warding wedge (FW) “the shaded part in the figure”. One of the nodes in this wedge
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will perform the forwarding task based on the N−player non-cooperative game. In
WLEB, every sender/forwarder located in the selected FW will try to fairly distribute
the generated-or-received traffic over its own FWs. Such traffic distribution were
achieved using an evolutionary game based on the residual energy in these wedges.
The sender or relay in those wedges will attaches the information of the following
parameters to each transmitted packet:
1. The angle, θ, that bounds a selected FW .
2. The number of neighbor nodes N in this wedge.
3. The location of sender which is represented by three coordinates (x, y, z).
4. The proportion of packets, λk assigned to kth FW.
Those parameters then utilized by the wedges nodes to identify if they are in the
selected FW or not, using the following criteria,
arctan 2[(
−→
SA× SD)× (SD × SO) ·
−→
SD
‖ SD ‖ ,
(SA× SD)× (−→SD ×−→SO)] ∈ θ (4.1)
where SA represents the vector from sender S to the node A, SD is the vector from
sender to the destination D, and SO is the vector from the sender to the polar of
transmission sphere O.
The node drops the received packet, if the node is not in the designated FW or
if the packet has already been forwarded. Then the nodes in the selected FW will
play N -player non-cooperative game to determine the optimal node that is capable
to forward the received packet. One of the nodes will win the game and become
a new sender. Then, the the sender node will play it’s own evolutionary game to
distribute it’s traffic load (population) over its surrounding wedges in order to balance
the energy consumption among its neighborhood. However, every node executes a
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neighbor discovery procedure at the deployment time to acquire the number of it’s
neighbors to identify how many nodes are in each wedge which will also be used in
the next stage to determine the number of players in the next game. Then, a sender
runs the WLEB game of the protocol, which balances the energy consumption in the
FWs.
4.2.1 Wedge level energy balance (WLEB)
WLEB was modeled as a dynamic evolutionary game, in which the transmission
range of a sensor node is divided into a set of K FWs. These FWs have different
number of nodes N . Hence, the available energy in these wedges are different. For
any particular time interval, each node can be used as a generator or a receiver
of a packet population λ (except the source and destination nodes). In order to
extend the network lifetime and to prevent network traffic from condensing into a
particular region, those nodes will evenly distribute the packet populations among its
surrounding neighborhood nodes. Since the evolutionary game can capture the energy
dynamic changes in different FWs, it was utilized to achieve a well distributed traffic
loads over the FWs. The variation of wedges energy informations are acquired based
on the proportion of packets Xk = λk/λ which are forwarded through these wedges,
where λk is the number of packets forwarded through a wedge k. The evolution of
changes in the proportions of packets, X = [X1, ..., XK ], among FWs was calculated
according to the fitness function (payoff) as long as the fitness for all packets in all
wedges are unequal. When these proportions become stable and do not change with
time the system reaches the equilibrium state or stability. For this evolutionary game
the equilibrium vector X∗ = [X∗1 , ..., X
∗
K ] is considered as a proper solution for the
wedge level evolutionary game. This vector was used as a gauge to determine the
identical fitness (payoff) for a packet in all FWs. In this study the main components
of WLEB evolutionary game can be described as follows:
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1. Player: A packet is considered as a player while the sender plays the game on
behalf of the packets.
2. Population: The packets that are generated or received by a node are consid-
ered as a population of players λ.
3. Strategies: The variation of FWs selection are considered as a packet strategies
which is denoted by: S = [W1,W2, ...,WK ].
4. Fitness function: The amount of energy assigned to each packet when it is
forwarded through a certain wedge is quantified by the fitness function, where
the fitness function represents a packet’s satisfaction of energy usage in any
region and is defined in term of gain and cost.
In this game the net fitness for the packet that is forwarded through wedge k is
given by equation (3.1). In order to obtain the equilibrium packet distribution vector
X∗ the sender node evolves variation of packet proportions by switching these packets
among different FWs based on the residual energy in theses wedges. Replicator dy-
namics uses switching probability in equation (3.5) to determine the changes in inflow∑
l 6=kXlPk,l(X) and outflow
∑
l 6=kXkPl,k(X) of packets from one FW to another.
When the difference between the expected inflow of the packets and the expected
number of outflow of the packets through a wedge become equal, the system is said to
be at the stable state. This state of stability is reflected in the concept of replicator
dynamics which is given in equation (3.12).
The evolutionary equilibrium of the game is given in Subsection 3.2.3 and the
stability analysis which is given in Subsection 3.2.4 are also applicable on this WLEB
evolutionary game for 3D forwarding wedges. However, the number of nodes in
3D FW is different than in 2D forwarding sub-region because of discarding third
dimensional coordinate in 2D WSN. The wedge is considered dead when it does not
have enough energy for transmission.
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4.2.2 Node level energy balance (NLEB)
The objective of NLEB game is to balance the energy consumption in nodes in a FW
by making all nodes fairly participate in forwarding task. In this phase of 3D-GTEB,
the problem of forwarding packets through a certain FW is modeled as N -player
non-cooperative game. The N -player non-cooperative game is utilized to capture the
selfish behavior of the sensor nodes in WSN since every node tries not to participate
in forwarding in aim of preserve its energy.
This game modeling tries to motivate nodes to cooperate and participate in for-
warding tasks fairly based on the Nash equilibrium (NE). NE is considered as the
optimal solution for the game where all players are satisfied. The normal form game
formulation which is denoted by, G = {Nk, S, Ui,i∈Nk} is given in Table 3.1.
NLEB N -player non-cooperative game consists of three main components:
1. Players: A set of Nk nodes in the same FW is considered as players and Nk ≥ 2.
2. Strategies: Each player has a set of two mixed-strategies, S = [B, B¯], where B
and B¯ represents broadcasting and no broadcasting respectively. A node plays
strategy B with a probability q, and plays strategy B¯ with probability 1− q.
3. Expected payoff: The expected payoff function Ui(s) quantifies the award for
node i when it plays one of its available strategies against other N−1 opponents.
Once nodes in a selected FW receive a packet, they start N -player non-cooperative
game. Then each node calculates its own expected payoff per equation (3.23) and
determines its NE strategy, q∗i based on the payoff matrix given in Table 3.1. The
NES for node i in Equation (3.24). As q∗i depends on the reward value v, a set
of experiments were conducted to determine v. The value of 30.16δ was found to
satisfy the network connectivity requirement [79] and a number of players to formulate
a game [52]. Based on NE strategy given in Equation (3.24), a node makes its
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forwarding decision if its forwarding probability, pi,k, is less than q
∗
i . The forwarding
probability, pi,k, of node i in Equation 3.26 which is calculated based on the following
three factors:
1. The ideal share of packets, which must be forwarded by every node in a selected
forwarding region, ( (Ci−C´i)
Ci
).
2. The ratio of the residual energy in a node to it’s initial energy, ( E´i
Ei
).
3. The share of packets which is assigned to a selected FW by the sender, ( (λk−λ´k)
λk
).
Then, the node compares it’s own pi,k with q
∗
i and it forwards if pi,k ≤ q∗i otherwise
waits for round trip time (RTT) of a packet and drops it if it does not overhear the
packet. However, a sensor node is considered dead when it does not have enough
energy for transmission.
4.3 Results and Discussion
In this section, a set of experiments have been conducted to evaluate the performance
of 3D-GTEB. OMNeT++ 4.2.2 with MiXiM framework was used to simulate the
network. The simulation parameters used to configure WSN scenario are given in
Table 3.3. The sensors in the network were randomly deployed in a 3D space with
dimensions of 100×100×100 m3. In this network, four sensor nodes were considered
as sources and they can report to the base station. converge-cast traffic pattern was
used. The transmission power, in sensor nodes, was set to achieve successful delivery
to nodes within a distance equal to the chosen transmission range. In this study, a
WSN with M sensor nodes, where the number of sensors is varied from 120 to 520
nodes, was considered. All results have been acquired by averaging the outcomes of
10 simulation runs with different network topologies. The performance of 3D-GTEB
was investigated based on three metrics:
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1. Network lifetime.
2. Average energy consumption per packet.
3. Packet delivery ratio.
The performance of 3D-GTEB protocol was evaluated in comparison with 2D-GTEB
in three scenarios. These scenarios are:
1. The first scenario concerns the lifetime of network with moderately network
density of 120 sensor nodes with various packet generation rates (PGR).
2. The second scenario concerns the lifetime of network with various network densi-
ties, where the number of sensors varied from 120 to 520 sensors and generation
rate of two packets per second. On the other hand, 2D-GTEB network was
deployed in 2D terrain of 100× 100 m2.
3. The third scenario concerns the packet delivery ratio with different packet gen-
eration rates.
62
120 160 200 240 280 320 360 400 440 480 5200
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
5000
Number of nodes in deployment space
N
et
w
or
k 
lif
et
im
e 
(H
ou
rs)
 
 
2D−GTEB
3D−GTEB
Figure 4.2. Network lifetime versus different densities.
4.3.1 Network lifetime
In this experiment, 3D-GTEB was compared with 2D-GTEB routing protocol to
evaluate the effect of considering the third dimension on the network performance.
The experiment was conducted based on packet generation of two packets per second
with varied number of sensors from 120 to 520 nodes. Figure 4.2 presents the network
lifetime of both protocols versus the various number of sensors. In 3D-GTEB, the
network lifetime was prolonged longer by 2% to 25% in comparison with 2D-GTEB.
This performance of network in 3D-GTEB is due to considering the third dimension
by nodes in forwarding decision. Although the increase in the network density causes
more redundant transmissions, 3D-GTEB limits the number of participated nodes
better than 2D-GTEB.
Figure 4.3 shows the network lifetime versus various packet generation rates, which
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Figure 4.3. Network lifetime versus different packet generation rates.
varies between 1 to 14 packets per second. The lifetime provided by 3D-GTEB is
longer than 2D-GTEB even with increased traffic loads.
4.3.2 Average energy consumption per packet
This set of experiments concerns about the performance of 3D-GTEB in term of av-
erage energy required to successfully deliver a packet with increase in the number of
sensor nodes in the network. Figure 4.4 depicts the average energy consumption per
packet versus different number of deployed sensors. In this experiment the obtained
results are collected based on a network with different number of nodes and packet
generation rate of two packets per second. The figure shows that a packet requires
less energy per packet in 3D-GTEB than in 2D-GTEB by 4% to 21%. This is because
3D-GTEB utilizes less number of sensors to forward the packet.
64
120 160 200 240 280 320 360 400 440 480 5200
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.1
Number of nodes in deployment space
A
ve
ra
ge
 e
ne
rg
y 
pe
r p
ac
ke
t (
Jo
ule
s)
 
 
2D−GTEB
3D−GTEB
Figure 4.4. Energy per packet versus different densities.
Figure 4.5 shows the energy consumption per packet versus different packet gener-
ation rate. The figure shows the impact of the increase in traffic load in the network
on the average energy consumed per packet. Despite of this traffic increase 3D-
GTEB performance is better than 2D-GTEB because less number of nodes in 3D
space may be located in the same forwarding region in comparison with 2D space.
In 2D-GTEB deployment, the node density in forwarding region is high because all
nodes are distributed on flat surface while in 3D-GTEB the nodes are distributed in
3D space.Therefore, in 2D space the packet passes through more nodes in comparison
with 3D space, causing longer queuing delay and higher congestion.
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Figure 4.5. Energy per packet versus different packet generation rates.
4.3.3 Packet delivery ratio
In this set of experiments the packet delivery ratio is evaluated based on packet
generation rate of two packet per seconds and the different network densities. In
both protocol the deal-line was set to be 0.250 second. Figure 4.6 depicts the packet
delivery ratio versus different number of sensor nodes. The figure shows the delivery
ratio of 3D-GETB increase with the increase in the number of sensor nodes in the
deployment area. This is because, more nodes are required to be deployed to fill 3D
space in comparison with 2D space and with less number leads to to dis-connectivity
or sparse network.
This increase in empty regions makes more packet miss their deadlines. However,
when more nodes deployed in 3D terrain the delivery ratio increase due to considering
third dimension in routing decision, while in 2D more nodes will forward packets even
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Figure 4.6. Packet delivery ratio versus different network densities.
if they are not located in the forwarding region because of nodes projection on a flat
surface.
4.4 Summary
This chapter proposes a decentralized and scalable routing protocol, called three
dimensional game theoretic energy balance (3D-GTEB). This protocol utilizes 3D
information in geographical routing to enhance the routing decisions and to mini-
mize the network overhead. Additionally, energy balance in the protocol was further
improved by using two levels of game theoretic decision making. The first level is
called wedge level energy balance, which employs evolutionary game theory to bal-
ance traffic load over a set of forwarding wedges. EGT shows effective improvement
in network lifetime and energy consumption per packet. The second level is called
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node level energy balance. This technique utilizes the advantage of classical game
theory to capture the selfish behavior of nodes, where they tend not to participate in
forwarding to preserve their energy, and to encourage them to participate in forward-
ing. The simulation results shows that 3D-GTEB provides significant improvement
in network lifetime over similar 2D-GTEB. Moreover, considering third dimension in
3D-GTEB can further extend the network lifetime.
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CHAPTER 5
PROTOCOL EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS
5.1 Introduction
The effectiveness of combined RLEB evolutionary game and NLEB N -player non-
cooperative game in GTEB was tested against three random test protocols. These
three random test protocols are labeled as: Random-Random, Random-CGT, and
EGT-Random. In these labeling, the first label indicates the decision making mech-
anism of packet forwarding sub-region selection and traffic load assignment and the
second label indicates the decision making mechanism of forwarding node selection
in a sub-region.
Table 3.3 shows the simulation parameters that are used to configure WSNs.
Random test protocols and GTEB protocol have been evaluated using OMNET++
4.2.2 network simulator with MiXiM framework [81].
In this analysis study, the transmission range of a sender/relay node is divided into
K packet forwarding sub-regions. Different network scenarios in term of the number
of deployed sensors and traffic generation rates were considered. Every random test
protocol was designed to evaluate the effectiveness of using one of the game theoretic
decision making in one level on the network performance. Additionally, the influence
of different sizes of packet forwarding regions on network lifetime was also evaluated.
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The performance of the proposed protocol, GTEB, was analyzed for the following
three routing matrices: network lifetime, average energy consumption per packet, and
packet delivery ratio. The three random test protocols will be discussed in Section 5.4,
the evaluation and analysis study presented in Section 5.3. In Section 5.4, the influ-
ence of different sizes of packet forwarding regions is analyzed. Finally, the summary
of the chapter is presented in Section 5.5.
5.2 Random Test Protocols
5.2.1 Random-Random protocol
The objective of this test protocol is to evaluate the influence of applying two levels
of game theoretic decision making on the network performance. In this scenario, the
forwarding region were choose randomly and the forwarding node in a forwarding
region was also selected randomly. The amount of the proportions of the packets that
assigned to the forwarding sub-regions and the nodes in the sub-region were randomly
determined regardless the amount of residual energy in the nodes and regions. In this
forwarding routing algorithm, the sender spreads it’s traffic load randomly on it’s
neighborhood and a potential forwarding node generates a random number either 0
and 1 and if the this number is 1 the node forwards the packet otherwise drops it.
5.2.2 Random-CGT protocol
The objective of this random test protocol is to assess the performance of the network
when the traffic load is randomly distributing over the set of packet forwarding sub-
regions, while in the forwarding subregion one node is selected to perform the packet
forwarding task based on the classical game theory. In the region level, the sender
randomly distributes its traffic population over the forwarding sub-regions, while in
the node level N -player non-cooperative game was used to distribute the traffic load
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among the region nodes. Every node in forwarding subregion forward or drop the
received packet on it’s forwarding probability as given in (3.26) and Nash equilibrium
in equation (3.24). The detail of N -player non-cooperative game is discussed in
Section 3.2.5.
5.2.3 EGT-Random protocol
This protocol is used to evaluate influence of EGT utilization on the network life-
time and packet delivery ratio. In this test scenario, the sender spreads it’s packet
population over a set of packet forwarding sub-regions based on their residual energy
using the concepts of replicator dynamics in EGT, while a forwarding node in the
sub-region was chosen randomly. The detail of the RLEB evolutionary game is stated
in Section 3.2.1. The findings of this experiment signifies the effectiveness of combin-
ing two different games in GTEB in comparison with one game in EGT-Random on
the network performance. The results of these studies are presented and discussed in
the next section.
5.3 Network Performance Analysis
5.3.1 The effect of network density on network lifetime
In this set of experiments, the packet generation rate was chosen to be two packets
per second whereas the number of sensor nodes is varied from 120 to 520 nodes. Fig-
ure 5.1 presents the network lifetime versus the number of nodes in deployment space.
The figure shows GTEB provided 9% to 38% longer network operation compared to
other three random forwarding algorithms. This superior performance is because of
balancing the energy consumption in nodes surrounding the senders/relays using evo-
lutionary game and eliminating redundant transmissions in the forwarding sub-regions
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Figure 5.1. The effect of network density on lifetime in GTEB and the three
protocols.
using N -player non-cooperative game. However, EGT-Random curve shows similar
trend as GTEB but with relatively lower lifetime, since at node level, the random node
selection algorithm does perform as good as game theoretic approach. On the other
hand, for the two other approaches, namely Random-CGT and Random-Random,
the packets are randomly distributed to the regions, and lifetime is significantly re-
duced as a result. That confirms unfair packet distribution over forwarding regions
significantly shorten the lifetime. Although, the increased node density may cause
more redundant transmissions, GTEB effectively managed forwarding decisions to
distribute the packets among the nodes and achieved the best result.
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Figure 5.2. The effect of traffic load on the network lifetime in GTEB and the three
protocols.
5.3.2 The effect of traffic load on network lifetime
This set of experiments was conducted to check GTEB’s ability to deal with various
traffic load amounts when the network size is fixed. Figure 5.2 illustrates the perfor-
mance of GTEB with increasing the packet generation rate in a fixed network size of
120 nodes. This figure shows that the GTEB protocol performance is better than the
other three random protocols even with increased traffic load by 30% to 78%, due to
intelligent forwarding decision making.
This figure proofs that using forwarding probability provided by Nash equilibrium
condition and fitness function in game theoretic approaches will allows better utiliza-
tion of energy in each sensor network compared with other random protocols. GTEB
integrates the accumulated energy in various sub-regions and the remaining energy
in every individual node in sub-region in forwarding decision, while for other random
protocols at least one level does not consider the energy factor in their forwarding
decision and forwards the packet randomly.
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Figure 5.3. The effect of network density on energy per packet in GTEB and three
random protocols.
5.3.3 The effect of network density on average energy con-
sumption per packet
The energy that is required for successfully delivering a packet to the destination is
evaluated in this section. In this scenario, GTEB is evaluated with three random
protocols. Figure 5.3 shows that the average consumed energy per packet in GTEB,
is better than other random algorithms by 1.12% to 60%. In this figure, the results
are obtained based on different network densities with packet generation rate of two
packets per second. The figure shows that the increase in the number of sensor nodes
increases the energy consumed per packet, because random protocols do not consider
the residual energy or do not considered ideal number of packets to be forwarded by
each node and forwarding region.
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Figure 5.4. The effect of traffic load on energy per packet in GTEB and three random
protocols.
5.3.4 The effect of the traffic load on average energy con-
sumption per packet
This set of experiments measures the effect of varied traffic load on the energy con-
sumed per packet. Figure 5.4 illustrates the energy consumption per packet in GTEB
and other three random protocols with different packet generation rates. The figure
shows that increased traffic in the network impacts on the average energy consumed
per packet. However, despite of this traffic increase GTEB still has better perfor-
mance because of every node makes ideal forwarding decision based on combination
of Nash equilibrium and its forwarding probability which considered node’s residual
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Figure 5.5. Packet delivery ratio in GTEB and three test cases.
energy, its share of the packet forwarding and the share of packets that is assigned
to it’s own forwarding sub-region. Besides that, GTEB traffic distribution mecha-
nism prevents the traffic load from condense in some parts of the network. GTEB
performance is better than other random algorithms in average 1.12% to 87.13%. On
the contrary, the randomness of forwarding tasks and unfair traffic distribution, in
other protocols, causes this difference in energy depletion between them and GTEB
protocol.
5.3.5 The effect of the traffic load on packet delivery ratio
In this set of experiments the packet delivery ratio of GTEB is evaluated with other
random three random protocols with different packet generation rates varied from
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Figure 5.6. GTEB lifetime evaluation using two, four and eight packet forwarding
regions.
1 to 14 packets per second. In Figure 5.5, the packet delivery ratio, in GTEB, is
compared to three random test protocols. In this figure, GTEB shows better packet
delivery rate by 2% to 52% in comparison with other random test protocols despite
of increasing traffic load in the network. This promising results are obtained due to
avoiding the congested areas in the network and region with low node density.
5.4 The effect of Packet Forwarding Region’s Size
on Network Lifetime
The objective of this experiments is to evaluate the effect of the size of forwarding
sub-regions on the lifetime of the network. In these set of experiments, the network
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lifetime is evaluated with different number and sizes of packet forwarding regions
around sender/relay nodes. Figure 5.6 illustrates GTEB lifetime evaluation with
two, four and eight forwarding regions. The figure shows that with the increase in
the number of forwarding regions the network lifetime is significantly increased. This
improvement is correlated with the size of forwarding regions, because with small size
of regions there will be smaller number of nodes, which can participate in forwarding
task, consequently more nodes preserve their energy. While with large regions, more
nodes spent their energy for receiving and manipulating the packets. The figure shows
that the average lifetime extension is from 8% to 44% in case of eight forwarding sub-
regions.
5.5 Summary
In this analysis study, it is observed that employing two levels of game theoretic
decision making is more effective than employing only one level to improve the net-
work’s performance. The simulation results showed that GTEB provided significant
improvement in term of extending network lifetime and packet delivery ratio over a
number of random test protocols (when only one level of game theoretic decision is
used). Moreover, dividing the transmission range of a sender/relay node into smaller
forwarding regions prolonged the network operation even further. The results also
confirmed that GTEB is adaptive to different network factors including: network
density variation, traffic load variation and asymmetric energy use.
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CHAPTER 6
DISSERTATION CONCLUSION
6.1 Contributions
This dissertation has presented two adaptive, scalable, and energy balance routing
protocols that utilize the location information of sensor nodes to provide wide en-
ergy balance in order to extend the network lifetime. In this dissertation two games
theoretic: energy balanced routing geographical protocols for WSNs deployed in 2D
space and 3D space were presented. In both protocols, the effectiveness of proposed
methods was demonstrated through a set of numerical simulations. The results pro-
vided confirm that these protocols can be successfully implemented in many WSN
application scenarios, to balance energy consumption and to extend WSN lifetime.
Both proposed protocols were designed based on the concept of an even distribu-
tion of the traffic load over a large section of the sensor network. The first protocol
GTEB routing protocol for WSNs is designed to be implemented in 2D WSNs, while
the second protocol, three dimensional 3D-GTEB is designed to work with a network
that deployed in 3D space.
In GTEB and 3D-GTEB, the problem of energy balance is divided into two sub-
problems, which are RLEB and NLEB. In RLEB, an evolutionary game was utilized
to provide energy balance on a set of forwarding sub-regions around every sensor node
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between source and destinations. The results proveded in this dissertation shows that,
the using of EGT was useful to balance the energy on a set of packet forwarding sub-
regions because of its ability to capture the dynamic changes in the energy in those
regions. In NLEB, N -player non-cooperative game was used to balance energy con-
sumption in nodes that are located in the sub-regions. The evaluation experiments
proved that N -player non-cooperative game will provide a good balance hence, the
network lifetime was extended. A simulation study was conducted to compare GTEB
proposed algorithm with RTLD [29], RPAR [35] and probabilistic forwarding proto-
cols in term of network lifetime, energy consumption per packet and packet delivery
ratio. The proposed protocol made the network function is longer than the function
of other competing GRPs with better packet delivery ratio.
3D-GTEB was designed to benefit from the advantages of considering the third
coordinate of the nodes’ locations to provide an accurate routing calculation and
lowering the network overhead. This protocol was named 3D-GTEB and designed
to work with WSNs deployed in 3D terrain when the third coordinate can not be
discarded. The simulation results showed that by considering the third coordinate
in the routing algorithm will provide a better packet delivery ratio and the network
operation will last longer than the GTEB, which was designed to work with WSNs
deployed in 2D space.
The effectiveness of implementing evolutionary game theory and classical game
theory on the network performance was evaluated based on various scenarios. GTEB
was compared to three random test protocols: Random-Random, Random-CGT and
EGT-Random. These random test protocols were employed by considering only one
level game theoretic decision making either in region level or node level. The results
confirm that GTEB will prolonged the network lifetime more than in other three
protocols, less energy consumed per packet, and the ratio of delivered packets was
higher than in comparison to other three random protocols.
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6.2 Future Research Directions
In this dissertation, it assumed that the WSN is static and sensor node mobility is
not inspected. Thus, it would be interesting to consider the network mobility to the
improved version of both protocols GTEB and 3D-GTEB. However, it is expected
that, with some minor modifications, the protocols would improve the performance
of the 2D-WSNs and 3D-WSNs dynamic. Finally, the findings of this dissertation
were conducted on the basis of numerical analysis using simulation tests. It would
be interesting to implement the proposed GTEB and 3D-GTEB protocols in real
sensors and evaluate the performance (network lifetime, average energy consumption
per packet and packet delivery ratio) of the protocols in real life applications.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX A: STABILITY ANALYSIS OF RLEB
A.1 Stability Analysis of RLEB Evolutionary Game
Over K Regions
To provide stability analysis of RLEB evolutionary game over a set of K packet
forwarding sub-regions, the set of differential equations of replicator dynamics is given
by,
X˙ = P (X)X −X, (A.1)
which must have ESSs that satisfy the conditions in (2.6a) and (2.6b). In (A.1), X =
{X1, ..., XK} packet proportion distribution over K sub-regions and P (X) represents
the transition probability matrix for a packet to move from one sub-region to any
other sub-regions. The transition probability matrix is given by:
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P (X) =

1 βX1(F1(X)− F2(X) βX1(F1(X)− F3(X) · · · βX1(F1(X)− Fk(X)
0 1− βX1(F1(X)− F2(X) βX2(F2(X)− F3(X) · · · βX2(F2(X)− Fk(X)
.
.
.
.
.
.
. .
.
.
.
.
0 0 0 1− βX2(F2(X)− Fk(X)

Hence, in order to find the equilibrium vector X∗, the set of equations in (A.1)
must be equated to zero and solved where the following two conditions are satisfied,
Xk ≥ 0 and, (A.2)
K∑
k=1
Xk = 1. (A.3)
Since the replicator dynamics in (A.1) depend on P (X), which is a continuous
function over the closed interval [0, 1]. Then the function f(X) which is defined
on the space of all X by f(X) = P (X)X is also continuous on the same interval.
Consequently, as proven by Brouwer fixed point theorem [87], there will be at least
one fixed point for f(X). This fixed point represents the equilibrium state of (A.1)
and denoted by X∗. Since P (X) has positive entries then the vector X∗ = P (X∗)X∗
is positive.
In order to proof that X∗ is ESSs, the system of equation (A.1) is linearized around
X∗ and Eigenvalues in Jacboain Matrix of (A.1) must have negative real parts. The
linearization of (A.1) around X∗ is given by,
X˙ = (X∗P (X∗)−X∗) +
K∑
j=1
(Jk,j(X
∗)(Xj −X∗j )) (A.4)
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(A.4) can be simplified as,
X˙k =
K∑
j=1
(Jk,j(X
∗)(Xj −X∗j )), (A.5)
where J(X) = [Jk,j(X
∗)] is Jacobian Matrix and can be defined as below equation,
J(X) =

X1β
K∑
j=2
X1
∂F1(X)
∂X1
−X1X2β
∂F2(X)
∂X2
−X1X3β
∂F3(X)
∂X3
· · · −X1Xkβ
∂Fk(X)
∂Xk
−X2X1β
∂F1(X)
∂X1
X2X1β
∂F2(X)
∂X2
+X2β
k∑
j=3
Xj
∂F2(X)
∂X2
−X2X3β
∂F3(X)
∂X3
· · · −X2Xkβ
∂Fk(X)
∂Xk
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
−XkX1β
∂F1(X)
∂X1
−XkX2β
∂F2(X)
X2
−XkX3β
∂F3(X)
∂X3
· · · Xkβ
k−1∑
i=1
Xj
∂Xk(X)
∂Xk

Since the summation of the columns’ elements in J(X) are zeroes then Jacobian
matrix has Eigenvalues of zeroes. Furthermore, the diagonal elements Ji,i(X) are
negative because ∂Fi(X)
∂Xi
< 0 and J(X) is diagonally dominant in a way such that
Ji,i(X) +
∑
j 6=i |Jj,i(X)| = 0 ∀i. Greshgorin circle theorem [88] implies that all other
Eigenvalues in J(X) have negative real parts and this proves that X∗ is ESSs [78].
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